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Abstract
Neural network NLP models are vulnerable to
small modifications of the input that maintain
the original meaning but result in a different
prediction. In this paper, we focus on robust-
ness of text classification against word substi-
tutions, aiming to provide guarantees that the
model prediction does not change if a word
is replaced with a plausible alternative, such
as a synonym. As a measure of robustness,
we adopt the notion of the maximal safe ra-
dius for a given input text, which is the min-
imum distance in the embedding space to the
decision boundary. Since computing the ex-
act maximal safe radius is not feasible in prac-
tice, we instead approximate it by comput-
ing a lower and upper bound. For the upper
bound computation, we employ Monte Carlo
Tree Search in conjunction with syntactic fil-
tering to analyse the effect of single and multi-
ple word substitutions. The lower bound com-
putation is achieved through an adaptation of
the linear bounding techniques implemented
in tools CNN-Cert and POPQORN, respec-
tively for convolutional and recurrent network
models. We evaluate the methods on senti-
ment analysis and news classification models
for four datasets (IMDB, SST, AG News and
NEWS) and a range of embeddings, and pro-
vide an analysis of robustness trends. We also
apply our framework to interpretability analy-
sis and compare it with LIME.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have shown great
promise in Natural Language Processing (NLP),
outperforming other machine learning techniques
in sentiment analysis (Devlin et al., 2018), lan-
guage translation (Chorowski et al., 2015), speech
recognition (Jia et al., 2018) and many other
tasks1. Despite these successes, concerns have
1See https://paperswithcode.com/area/natural-language-processing
been raised about robustness and interpretability
of NLP models (Arras et al., 2016). It is known
that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial examples,
that is, imperceptible perturbations of a test point
that cause a prediction error (Goodfellow et al.,
2014). In NLP this issue manifests itself as a sen-
sitivity of the prediction to small modifications of
the input text (e.g., replacing a word with a syn-
onym). In this paper we work with DNNs for
text analysis and, given a text and a word embed-
ding, consider the problem of quantifying the ro-
bustness of the DNN with respect to word substi-
tutions. In particular, we define the maximal safe
radius (MSR) of a text as the minimum distance (in
the embedding space) of the text from the decision
boundary, i.e., from the nearest perturbed text that
is classified differently from the original. Unfortu-
nately, computation of the MSR for a neural net-
work is an NP-hard problem and becomes imprac-
tical for real-world networks (Katz et al., 2017).
As a consequence, we adapt constraint relax-
ation techniques (Weng et al., 2018a; Zhang et al.,
2018; Wong and Kolter, 2018) developed to com-
pute a guaranteed lower bound of the MSR for
both convolutional (CNNs) and recurrent neural
networks (RNNs). Furthermore, in order to com-
pute an upper bound for the MSR we adapt
the Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) algorithm
(Coulom, 2007) to word embeddings to search
for (syntactically and semantically) plausible word
substitutions that result in a classification differ-
ent from the original; the distance to any such
perturbed text is an upper bound, albeit possibly
loose. We employ our framework to perform an
empirical analysis of the robustness trends of sen-
timent analysis and news classification tasks for a
range of embeddings on vanilla CNN and LTSM
models. In particular, we consider the IMDB
dataset (Maas et al., 2011), the Stanford Sentiment
Treebank (SST) data et (Socher et al., 2013), the
AG News Corpus Dataset (Zhang et al., 2015)
and the NEWS Dataset (Vitale et al., 2012). We
empirically observe that, although generally NLP
models are vulnerable to minor perturbations and
their robustness degrades with the dimensionality
of the embedding, in some cases we are able to cer-
tify the text’s classification against any word sub-
stitution. Furthermore, we show that our frame-
work can be employed for interpretability analysis
by computing a saliency measure for each word,
which has the advantage of being able to take into
account non-linearties of the decision boundary
that local approaches such as LIME (Ribeiro et al.,
2016) cannot handle.
In summary this paper makes the following
main contributions:
• We develop a framework for quantifying the
robustness of NLPmodels against (single and
multiple) word substitutions based on MSR
computation.
• We adapt existing techniques for approximat-
ing theMSR (notably CNN-Cert, POPQORN
and MCTS) to word embeddings and seman-
tically and syntactically plausible word sub-
stitutions.
• We evaluate vanilla CNN and LSTM senti-
ment and news classification models on a
range of embeddings and datasets, and pro-
vide a systematic analysis of the robustness
trends and comparison with LIME on inter-
pretability analysis.
Related Work. Deep neural networks are
known to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks
(small perturbations of the network input that
result in a misclassification) (Szegedy et al.,
2014; Biggio et al., 2013; Biggio and Roli,
2018). The NLP domain has also been shown
to suffer from this issue (Belinkov and Bisk,
2018; Ettinger et al., 2017; Gao et al., 2018;
Jia and Liang, 2017; Liang et al., 2017;
Zhang et al., 2020). The vulnerabilities of NLP
models have been exposed via, for example, small
character perturbations (Ebrahimi et al., 2018),
syntactically controlled paraphrasing (Iyyer et al.,
2018), targeted keywords attacks (Alzantot et al.,
2018; Cheng et al., 2018), and exploitation of
back-translation systems (Ribeiro et al., 2018).
Formal verification can guarantee that the classifi-
cation of an input of a neural network is invariant
to perturbations of a certain magnitude, which
can be established through the concept of the
maximal safe radius (Wu et al., 2020) or, dually,
minimum adversarial distortion (Weng et al.,
2018b). While verification methods based on
constraint solving (Katz et al., 2017, 2019) and
mixed integer programming (Dutta et al., 2018;
Cheng et al., 2017) can provide complete ro-
bustness guarantees, in the sense of computing
exact bounds, they are expensive and do not
scale to real-world networks because the prob-
lem itself is NP-hard (Katz et al., 2017). To
work around this, incomplete approaches, such
as search-based methods (Huang et al., 2017;
Wu and Kwiatkowska, 2020) or reachability
computation (Ruan et al., 2018), instead compute
looser robustness bounds with much greater
scalability, albeit relying on the knowledge of non-
trivial Lipschitz constants. In this work, we exploit
approximate, scalable, linear constraint relaxation
methods (Weng et al., 2018a; Zhang et al., 2018;
Wong and Kolter, 2018), which do not assume
Lipschitz continuity. In particular, we adapt
the CNN-Cert tool (Boopathy et al., 2019) and
its recurrent extension POPQORN (Ko et al.,
2019) to compute robustness guarantees for text
classification in the NLP domain. We note that
NLP robustness has also been addressed using
interval bound propagation (Huang et al., 2019;
Jia et al., 2019).
2 Robustness Quantification of Text
Classification against Word
Substitutions
In text classification an algorithm processes a
text and associates it to a category. Raw text,
i.e., a sequence of words (or similarly sentences
or phrases), is converted to a sequence of real-
valued vectors through an embedding E : W →
X ⊆ Rd, which maps each element of a fi-
nite set W (e.g., a vocabulary) into a vector of
real numbers. There are many different ways
to build embeddings (Goldberg and Levy, 2014;
Pennington et al., 2014; Wallach, 2006), nonethe-
less their common objective is to capture relations
among words. Furthermore, it is also possible
to enforce into the embedding syntactic/semantic
constraints, a technique commonly known as
counter-fitting (Mrksˇic´ et al., 2016), which we as-
sess from a robustness perspective in Section 3.
Each text is represented univocally by a sequence
of vectors x = (x1, . . . , xm), where m ∈ N, xi ∈
X , padding if necessary. In this work we consider
text classification with neural networks, hence, a
text embedding x is classified into a category c ∈
C , through a trained network N : Rd·m[0,1] → R|C|,
i.e., c = argmaxi∈C Ni(x), where without any
loss of generality we assume that each dimension
of the input space of N is normalized between 0
and 1. We note that pre-trained embeddings are
scaled before training, thus resulting in a L∞ di-
ameter whose maximum value is 1. Thus, the
lower and upper bound measurements are affected
by normalization only when one compares embed-
dings with different dimensions with norms dif-
ferent from L∞. In this paper robustness is mea-
sured for both convolutional and recurrent neural
networks with the distance between words in the
embedding space that is calculated with either L2
or L∞-norm: while the former is a proxy for se-
mantic similarity between words in polarized em-
beddings (this is discussed more in details in the
Experimental Section), the latter, by taking into
account the maximum variation along all the em-
bedding dimensions, is used to compare different
robustness profiles.
2.1 Robustness Measure against Word
Substitutions
Given a text embedding x, a metric Lp, a subset
of word indices I ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}, and a distance
ǫ ∈ R≥0, we define Ball(x, ǫ) = {x′ ∈ Rd·m[0,1] |
‖xI − x′I‖p ≤ ǫ ∧ (∀i /∈ I, xi = x′i)}, where xI
is the sub-vector of x that contains only embed-
ding vectors corresponding to words in I . That is,
Ball(x, ǫ) is the set of embedded texts obtained by
replacing words in I within x and whose distance
to x is no greater than ǫ. We elide the index set I
to simplify the notation. Below we define the no-
tion of the maximal safe radius (MSR), which is
the minimum distance of an embedding text from
the decision boundary of the network.
Definition 1 (Maximal Safe Radius). Given a neu-
ral network N, a subset of word indices I ⊆
{1, . . . ,m}, and a text embedding x, the maxi-
mal safe radius MSR(N,x) is the minimum dis-
tance from input x to the decision boundary, i.e.,
MSR(N,x) is equal to the largest ǫ ∈ R≥0 such
that ∀x′ ∈ Ball(x, ǫ) : argmaxiNi∈C(x′) =
argmaxiNi∈C(x).
For a text x let d = max
x
′∈Rd·m
[0,1]
‖xI − x′I‖p
be the diameter of the embedding, then a large
e1
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Figure 1: Illustration of the Maximal Safe Radius
(MSR) and its upper and lower bounds. An upper
bound of MSR is obtained by computing the distance
of any perturbation resulting in a class change (blue el-
lipse) to the input text. A lower bound certifies that
perturbations of the words contained within that radius
are guaranteed to not change the classification decision
(green ellipse). Both upper and lower bounds approxi-
mate the MSR (black ellipse). In this example the word
strange can be safely substituted with odd. The
word timeless is within upper and lower bound of
the MSR, so our approach cannot guarantee it would
not change the neural network prediction.
value for the normalised MSR,
MSR(N,x)
d
, indicates
that x is robust to perturbations of the given sub-
set I of its words, as substitutions of these words
do not result in a class change in the NN prediction
(in particular, if the normalised MSR is greater than
1 then x is robust to any perturbation of the words
in I). Conversely, low values of the normalised
MSR indicate that the network’s decision is vulner-
able at x because of the ease with which the clas-
sification outcomes can be manipulated. Further,
averaging MSR over a set of inputs yields a robust-
ness measure of the network, as opposed to being
specific to a given text. Under standard assump-
tions of bounded variation of the underlying learn-
ing function, the MSR is also generally employed
to quantify the robustness of the NN to adversar-
ial examples (Wu et al., 2020; Weng et al., 2018a),
that is, small perturbations that yield a prediction
that differs from ground truth. Since computing
the MSR is NP-hard (Katz et al., 2017), we instead
approximate it by computing a lower and an upper
bound for this quantity (see Figure 1). The strategy
for obtaining an upper bound is detailed in Section
2.2, whereas for the lower bound (Section 2.3) we
adapt constraint relaxation techniques developed
for the verification of deep neural networks.
2.2 Upper Bound: Monte Carlo Tree Search
An upper bound for MSR is a perturbation of the
text that is classified by the NN differently than the
original text. In order to only consider perturba-
tions that are syntactically coherent with the input
text, we use filtering in conjunction with an adap-
tation of the Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) al-
gorithm (Coulom, 2007) to the NLP scenario (Fig-
ure 2). The algorithm takes as input a text, em-
beds it as a sequence of vectors x, and builds
a tree where at each iteration a set of indices I
identifies the words that have been modified so
far: at the first level of the tree a single word is
changed to manipulate the classification outcome,
at the second two words are perturbed, with the
former being the same word as for the parent ver-
tex, and so on (i.e., for each vertex, I contains the
indices of the words that have been perturbed plus
that of the current vertex). We allow only word
for word substitutions. At each stage the proce-
dure outputs all the successful attacks (i.e., per-
turbed texts that are classified by the neural net-
work differently from the original text) that have
been found until the terminating condition is sat-
isfied (e.g., a fixed fraction out of the total num-
ber of vertices has been explored). Successful per-
turbations can be used as diagnostic information
in cases where ground truth information is avail-
able. The algorithm explores the tree according
to the UCT heuristic (Browne et al., 2012), where
urgent vertices are identified by the perturbations
that induce the largest drop in the neural network’s
confidence. A detailed description of the result-
ing algorithm, which follows the classical algo-
rithm (Coulom, 2007) while working directly with
word embeddings, can be found in Appendix A.1.
Perturbations are sampled by considering the n-
closest replacements in the word’s neighbourhood:
the distance between words is measured in the L2
norm, while the number of substitutions per word
is limited to a fixed constant (e.g., in our experi-
ments this is either 1000 or 10000). In order to
enforce the syntactic consistency of the replace-
ments we consider part-of-speech tagging of each
word based on its context. Then, we filter all the re-
placements found by MCTS to exclude those that
are not of the same type, or from a type that will
maintain the syntactic consistency of the perturbed
text (e.g., a noun sometimes can be replaced by an
adjective). To accomplish this task we use the Nat-
ural Language Toolkit (Bird et al., 2009). More
the movie is good
movie is good
< o
the the the
the  sample({a, all, for, ... })
movie  sample({lm, book, watch, ... })
the
the
Figure 2: Structure of the tree after two iterations of the
MCTS algorithm. Simulations of 1-word substitutions
are executed at each vertex on the first level to update
the UCT statistics. The most urgent vertex is then ex-
panded (e.g., word the) and several 2-words substitu-
tions are executed combining the word identified by the
current vertex (e.g., word movie at the second level of
the tree) and that of its parent, i.e., the. Redundant
substitutions may be avoided (greyed out branch).
details are provided in Appendix A.1.
2.3 Lower Bound: Constraint Relaxation
A lower bound for MSR(N,x) is a real num-
ber ǫl > 0 such that all texts in Ball(x, ǫl)
are classified in the same class by N. Note
that, as MSR(N,x) is defined in the embed-
ding space, which is continuous, the perturba-
tion space, Ball(x, ǫ), contains meaningful texts
as well as texts that are not syntactically or se-
mantically meaningful. In order to compute ǫl
we leverage constraint relaxation techniques de-
veloped for CNNs (Boopathy et al., 2019) and
LSTMs (Ko et al., 2019), namely CNN-Cert and
POPQORN. For an input text x and a hyper-
box around Ball(x, ǫ), these techniques find linear
lower and upper bounds for the activation func-
tions of each layer of the neural network and
use these to propagate an over-approximation of
the hyper-box through the network. ǫl is then
computed as the largest real such that all the
texts in Ball(x, ǫl) are in the same class, i.e.,
for all x′ ∈ Ball(x, ǫl), argmaxi∈C Ni(x) =
argmaxi∈C Ni(x
′). Note that, as Ball(x, ǫl) con-
tains only texts obtained by perturbing a subset of
the words (those whose index is in I), to adapt
CNN-Cert and POPQORN to our setting, we have
to fix the dimensions of x corresponding to words
not in I and only propagate through the network
intervals corresponding to words in I.
3 Experimental Results
We use our framework to empirically evaluate the
robustness of neural networks for sentiment anal-
ysis and news classification on typical CNN and
LSTM architectures. While we quantify lower
bounds of MSR for CNNs and LSTMs, respec-
tively, with CNN-Cert and POPQORN tools, we
implement the MCTS algorithm introduced in Sec-
tion 2.2 to search for meaningful perturbations
(i.e., upper bounds), regardless of the NN archi-
tecture employed. In particular, in Section 3.1
we consider robustness against single and multiple
word substitutions and investigate implicit biases
of LSTM architectures. In Section 3.2 we study
the effect of embedding on robustness, while in
Section 3.3 we employ our framework to perform
saliency analysis of the most relevant words in a
text.
Experimental Setup and Implementation We
have trained several vanilla CNN and LSTM
models on datasets that differ in length of
each input, number of target classes and dif-
ficulty of the learning task. All our experi-
ments were conducted on a server equipped with
two 24 core Intel Xenon 6252 processors and
256GB of RAM2,3. We consider the IMDB
dataset (Maas et al., 2011), the Stanford Senti-
ment Treebank (SST) dataset (Socher et al., 2013),
the AG News Corpus (Zhang et al., 2015) and
the NEWS dataset (Vitale et al., 2012): details
are in Table 1. In our experiments we consider
different embeddings, and specifically both com-
plex, probabilistically-constrained representations
(GloVe and GloVeTwitter) trained on global word-
word co-occurrence statistics from a corpus, as
well as the simplified embedding provided by the
Keras Python Deep Learning Library (referred to
as Keras Custom) (Chollet et al., 2015), which al-
lows one to fine tune the exact dimension of the
vector space and only aims at minimizing the loss
on the classification task. The resulting learned
Keras Custom embedding does not capture com-
plete word semantics, just their emotional polar-
ity. More details are reported in Appendix A.3
and Table 4. For our experiments, we consider a
2We emphasise that, although the experiments reported
here have been performed on a cluster, all the algorithms are
reproducible on a mid-end laptop; we used a machine with
16GB of RAM and an Intel-5 8th-gen. processor.
3Code for reproducing theMCTS experiments is available
at: https://github.com/EmanueleLM/MCTS
3-layer CNN, where the first layer consists of bi-
dimensional convolution with 150 filters, each of
size 3×3, and a LSTMmodel with 256 hidden neu-
rons on each gate. We have trained more than 20
architectures on the embeddings and datasets men-
tioned above. We note that, though other archi-
tectures might offer higher accuracy for sentence
classification (Kim, 2014), this vanilla setup has
been chosen intentionally not to be optimized for
a specific task, thus allowing us to measure robust-
ness of baseline models. Both CNNs and LSTMs
predict the output with a softmax output layer,
while the categorical cross-entropy loss function
is used during the optimization phase, which is per-
formed with Adam (Kingma and Ba, 2014) algo-
rithm (without early-stopping); further details are
reported in Appendix A.3.
3.1 Robustness to Word Substitutions
For each combination of a neural network and em-
bedding, we quantify the MSR against single and
multiple word substitutions, meaning that the set
of word indices I (see Definition 1) consists of 1 or
more indices. Interestingly, our framework is able
to prove that certain input texts and architectures
are robust for any single-word substitution, that is,
replacing a single word of the text (any word) with
any other possible other word, and not necessarily
with a synonym or a grammatically correct word,
will not affect the classification outcome. Figure 3
shows that for CNN models equipped with Keras
Custom embedding the (lower bound of the) MSR
on some texts from the IMDB dataset is greater
than the diameter of the embedding space. To
consider only perturbations that are semantically
close and syntactically coherent with the input
text, we employ the MCTS algorithm with filter-
ing described in Section 2.2. An example of a suc-
cessful perturbation is shown in Figure 4, where
we illustrate the effectiveness of single-word sub-
stitutions on inputs that differ in the confidence
of the neural network prediction. We note that
even with simple tagging it is possible to identify
perturbations where replacements are meaningful.
For the first example in Figure 4 (top), the net-
work changes the output class to Worldwhen the
word China is substituted for U.S.. Although
this substitution may be relevant to that particu-
lar class, nonetheless we note that the perturbed
text is coherent and the main topic remains sci-
tech. Furthermore, the classification changes
NEWS SST AG NEWS IMDB
Inputs (Train, Test) 22806, 9793 117220, 1821 120000, 7000 25000, 25000
Output Classes 7 2 4 2
Average Input Length 17± 2.17 17.058 ± 8.27 37.295 ± 9.943 230.8 ± 169.16
Max Input Length 88 52 136 2315
Max Length Considered 14 25 49 100
Table 1: Datasets used for the experimental evaluation. We report the number of samples (training/test ratio as
provided in the original works) and output classes, the average and maximum length of each input text before
pre-processing and the maximum length considered in our experiments.
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Figure 3: Lower bounds indicate classification invariance to any substitution when greater than the embedding
diameter d (see diagram on the right and Section 2), here represented by the dotted vertical line. Left: Examples of
words safe to any substitution (IMDB, Keras embedding 10d, text no 2). Middle: Examples of words vulnerable
to substitutions that may change the classification (IMDB, Keras embedding 5d, text no 1).
DIMENSION LOWER BOUND
Keras
5 0.278
10 0.141
25 0.023
50 0.004
100 0.002
GloVe
50 0.007
100 0.002
GloVeTwitter
25 0.013
50 0.008
100 0.0
Table 2: Comparison of lower bounds for single-
word substitutions computed by CNN-Cert on the SST
dataset. Values are averaged over 100 input texts (ap-
prox. 2500 measurements) and normalized by the em-
bedding diameter (L2-norm).
also when the word exists is replaced with a
plausible alternative misses, a perturbation that
is neutral, i.e. not informative for any of the possi-
ble output classes. In the third sentence in Figure 4
(bottom), we note that replacing championship
with wrestling makes the model output class
World, where originally it was Sport, indicat-
ing that the model relies on a small number of
key words to make its decision. We report a
few additional examples of word replacements for
a CNN model equipped with GloVe-50d embed-
ding. Given as input the review ’this is art
paying homage to art’ (from the SST
dataset), when art is replaced by graffiti
the network misclassifies the review (from pos-
itive to negative). Further, as mentioned ear-
lier, the MCTS framework is capable of find-
ing multiple word perturbations: considering the
same setting as in the previous example, when
in the review ’it’s not horrible just
horribly mediocre’ the words horrible
and horribly are replaced, respectively, with
gratifying and decently, the review is clas-
sified as positive, while for the original sentence
it was negative. Robustness results for high-
dimensional embeddings are included in Table 3,
where we report the trends of the average lower
and upper bounds of MSR and the percentage of
successful perturbations computed over 100 texts
(per dataset) for different architectures and embed-
dings. Further results are in Appendix A.3, includ-
ing statistics on lower bounds (Tables 5, 6) and sin-
gle and multiple word substitutions (Tables 7, 8).
CNNs vs. LTSMs By comparing the average
robustness assigned to each word, respectively,
by CNN-Cert and POPQORN over all the exper-
Single-Word Substitutions
EMBEDDING LOWER BOUND SUBSTITUTIONS UPPER BOUND
% per text % per word
IMDB
Keras50d 0.055 ± 0.011 6.0 1.4 0.986
GloVe50d 0.018 ± 0.007 39.7 5.1 0.951
GloVeTwitter50d 0.02 ± 0.002 47.0 7.7 0.926
AG News
Keras50d 0.002 ± 0.001 50.0 15.6 0.852
GloVe50d 0.005 ± 0.004 22.4 10.8 0.898
GloVeTwitter50d 0.007 ± 0.001 21.4 6.6 0.937
SST
Keras50d 0.004 ± 0.001 52.2 19.9 0.813
GloVe50d 0.007 ± 0.003 81.1 37.4 0.646
GloVeTwitter50d 0.008 ± 0.004 78.1 36.3 0.653
NEWS
GloVe50d 0.001 ± 0.002 96.5 34.0 0.679
GloVe100d 0.002 ± 0.002 89.7 29.1 0.727
GloVeTwitter50d 0.001 ± 0.001 90.9 30.6 0.707
GloVeTwitter100d 0.001 ± 0.001 89.7 27.7 0.739
Table 3: Statistics on single-word substitutions averaged on 100 input texts of each dataset. We report: the average
lower bound of the MSR as measured with either CNN-Cert or POPQORN; the approximate ratio that given a word
from a text we find a single-word substitution and the average number of words that substituted for a given word
change the classification; the average upper bound computed as the distance between the original word and the
closest substitution found by MCTS (when no successful perturbation is found we over-approximate the upper
bound for that word with the diameter of the embedding). Values reported for lower bounds have been normalized
by each embedding diameter (measurements in the L2-norm).
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Figure 4: Single-word substitutions found with MCTS
in conjunction with filtering. Grammatically consistent
substitutions shown in green, inconsistent in red, a dash
indicates that no substitution is found.
iments on a fixed dataset, it clearly emerges that
recurrent models are less robust to perturbations
that occur in very first words of a sentence; in-
terestingly, CNNs do not suffer from this prob-
lem. A visual comparison is shown in Figure 6.
The key difference is the structure of LSTMs com-
pared to CNNs: while in LSTMs the first input
word influences the successive layers, thus ampli-
fying the manipulations, the output of a convolu-
tional region is independent from any other of the
same layer. On the other hand, both CNNs and
LSTMs have in common an increased resilience
to perturbations on texts that contain multiple po-
larized words, a trend that suggests that, indepen-
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Figure 5: Lower bound values for individual words
obtained from POPQORN (L2-norm), showing an in-
creasing trend for consecutive words. (a) Two texts
with padding (<unk> denotes an unknown token). (b)
Texts with several words related to a specific output
class (U.S. and entertainment, respectively).
dently of the architecture employed, robustness re-
lies on a distributed representation of the content
in a text (Figure 5).
3.2 Influence of the Embedding on
Robustness
As illustrated in Table 2 and in Figure 3, mod-
els that employ small embeddings are more ro-
bust to perturbations. On the contrary, robust-
ness decreases, from one to two orders of magni-
tude, when words are mapped to high-dimensional
spaces, a trend that is confirmed also by MCTS
Figure 6: Robustness lower bound trends for succes-
sive input words for LSTMs (red dots) and CNNs (blue
dots) on NEWS and AG News datasets.
(see Appendix Table 8). This may be explained
by the fact that adversarial perturbations are in-
herently related to the dimensionality of the in-
put space (Carbone et al., 2020; Goodfellow et al.,
2014). We also discover that models trained
on longer inputs (e.g., IMDB) are more robust
compared to those trained on shorter ones (e.g.,
SST): in long texts the decision made by the
algorithm depends on multiple words that are
evenly distributed across the input, while for
shorter sequences the decision may depend on
very few, polarized terms. From Table 3 we note
that polarity-constrained embeddings (Keras) are
more robust than those that are probabilistically-
constrained (GloVe) on relatively large datasets
(IMDB), whereas the opposite is true on smaller
input dimensions: experiments suggest that mod-
els with embeddings that group together words
closely related to a specific output class (e.g., pos-
itive words) are more robust, as opposed to mod-
els whose embeddings gather words together on
a different principle (e.g., words that appear in
the same context): intuitively, in the former case,
words like good will be close to synonyms like
better and nice, while in the latter words like
good and bad, which often appear in the same
context (think of the phrase ’the movie was
good/bad’), will be closer in the embedding
space. In the spirit of the analysis in (Baroni et al.,
2014), we empirically measured whether robust-
ness is affected by the nature of the embedding
employed, that is, either prediction-based (i.e., em-
beddings that are trained alongside the classifi-
cation task) or hybrid/count-based (e.g., GloVe,
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Figure 7: For an increasing number of substitutions
per text we report the difference between MSR lower
bounds of counter-fitted and vanilla embeddings (Keras
and GloVeTwitter, 25d) on the AG News Dataset.
GloVeTwitter). By comparing the robustness of
different embeddings and the distance between
words that share the same polarity profile (e.g.,
positive vs. negative), we note that MSR is a partic-
ularly well suited robustness metric for prediction-
based embeddings, with the distance between
words serving as a reasonable estimator of word-
to-word semantic similarity w.r.t. the classifica-
tion task. On the other hand, for hybrid and count-
based embeddings (e.g., GloVe), especially when
words are represented as high-dimensional vec-
tors, the distance between two words in the embed-
ding space, when compressed into a single scalar,
does not retain enough information to estimate the
relevance of input variations. Therefore, in this
scenario, an approach based solely on the MSR is
limited by the choice of the distance function be-
tween words, and may lose its effectiveness unless
additional factors such as context are considered.
Further details of our evaluation are provided in
Appendix A.3, Table 5 and Figure 11.
Counter-fitting To mitigate the issue of robust-
ness in multi-class datasets characterized by short
sequences, we have repeated the robustness mea-
surements with counter-fitted (Mrksˇic´ et al., 2016)
embeddings, i.e., a method of injecting additional
constraints for antonyms and synonyms into vec-
tor space representations in order to improve the
vectors’ capability to encode semantic similarity.
We observe that the estimated lower bound of MSR
is in general increased for low-dimensional em-
beddings, up to twice the lower bound for non
counter-fitted embeddings. This phenomenon is
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Figure 8: Interpretability comparison of our framework
with LIME. (a) Saliency map produced with CNN-
Cert (top) and LIME (bottom) on IMDB (GloVeTwit-
ter 25d embedding). (b) Saliency map produced
with POPQORN (top) and LIME (bottom) on NEWS
dataset (GloVe 100d embedding).
particularly relevant when Keras Custom 5d and
10d are employed, see Appendix A.3, Table 6.
On the other hand, the benefits of counter-fitting
are less pronounced for high-dimensional embed-
dings. The same pattern can be observed in Fig-
ure 7, where multiple-word substitutions per text
are allowed. Further details can be found in Ap-
pendix A.3, Tables 6 and 8.
3.3 Interpretability of Sentiment Analysis via
Saliency Maps
We employ our framework to perform inter-
pretablity analysis on a given text. For each word
of a given text we compute the (lower bound of
the) MSR and use this as a measure of its saliency,
where small values of MSR indicate that minor
perturbations of that word can have a significant
influence on the classification outcome. We use
the above measure to compute saliency maps for
both CNNs and LSTMs, and compare our re-
sults with those obtained by LIME (Ribeiro et al.,
2016), which assigns saliency to input features ac-
cording to the best linear model that locally ex-
plains the decision boundary. Our method has
the advantage of being able to account for non-
linearities in the decision boundary that a local ap-
proach such as LIME cannot handle, albeit at a
cost of higher computational complexity (a similar
point was made in (Blaas et al., 2020) for Gaus-
sian processes). As a result, we are able to dis-
cover words that our framework views as impor-
tant, but LIME does not, and vice versa. In Fig-
ure 8 we report two examples, one for an IMDB
positive review (Figure 8 (a)) and another from
the NEWS dataset classified using a LTSM (Fig-
ure 8 (b)). In Figure 8 (a) our approach finds that
the word many is salient and perturbing it slightly
can make the NN change the class of the review
to negative. In contrast, LIME does not identify
many as significant. In order to verify this re-
sult empirically, we run our MCTS algorithm (Sec-
tion 2.2) and find that simply substituting many
with worst changes the classification to ‘nega-
tive’. Similarly, for Figure 8 (b), where the input
is assigned to class 5 (health), perturbing the
punctuation mark (:) may alter the classification,
whereas LIME does not recognise its saliency.
4 Conclusions
We introduced a framework for evaluating ro-
bustness of NLP models against word substitu-
tions. Through extensive experimental evaluation
we demonstrated that our framework allows one
to certify certain architectures against single word
perturbations and illustrated how it can be em-
ployed for interpretability analysis. While we fo-
cus on perturbations that are syntactically coher-
ent, we acknowledge that semantic similarity be-
tween phrases is a crucial aspect that nonetheless
requires an approach which takes into account the
context where substitutions happen: we will tackle
this limitation in future. Furthermore, we will ad-
dress robustness of more complex architectures,
e.g., networks that exploit attention-based mech-
anisms (Vaswani et al., 2017).
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A Appendix
A.1 Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS)
We adapt the MCTS algorithm (Browne et al.,
2012) to the NLP classification setting with word
embedding, which we report here for complete-
ness as Algorithm 1. The algorithm explores mod-
ifications to the original text by substituting one
word at the time with nearest neighbour alterna-
tives. It takes as input: text, expressed as a list of T
words;N, the neural network as introduced in Sec-
tion 2; E , an embedding; sims, an integer specify-
ing the number of Monte Carlo samplings at each
step; and α, a real-valued meta-parameter specify-
ing the exploration/exploitation trade-off for ver-
tices that can be further expanded. The salient
steps of the MCTS procedure are:
• Select: the most promising vertex to explore
is chosen to be expanded (Line 14) according
to the standard UCT heuristic:
Q(v)
N(v)
+ α
√
2lnN(v′)
N(v)
, where v and v′ are
respectively the selected vertex and its par-
ent; α is a meta-parameter that balances
exploration-exploitation trade-off; N() repre-
sents the number of times a vertex has been
visited; andQ() measures the neural network
confidence drop, averaged over the Monte
Carlo simulations for that specific vertex.
• Expand: the tree is expanded with T new
vertices, one for each word in the input text
(avoiding repetitions). A vertex at index t ∈
{1, ...T} and depth n > 0 represents the strat-
egy of perturbing the t-th input word, plus all
the words whose indices have been stored in
the parents of the vertex itself, up to the root.
• Simulate: simulations are run from the cur-
rent position in the tree to estimate how the
neural network behaves against the perturba-
tions sampled at that stage (Line 23). If one
of the word substitutions induced by the sim-
ulation makes the network change the classifi-
cation, a successful substitution is found and
added to the results, while the value Q of the
current vertex is updated. Many heuristics
can be considered at this stage, for example
the average drop in the confidence of the net-
work over all the simulations. We have found
that the average drop is not a good measure
of how the robustness of the network drops
when some specific words are replaced, since
for a high number of simulations a pertur-
bation that is effective might pass unnoticed.
We thus work with the maximum drop over
all the simulations, which works slightly bet-
ter in this scenario (Line 27).
• Backpropagate: the reward received is
back-propagated to the vertices visited dur-
ing selection and expansion to update their
UCT statistics. It is known that, when
UCT is employed (Browne et al., 2012;
Kocsis and Szepesva´ri, 2006), MCTS guaran-
tees that the probability of selecting a sub-
optimal perturbation tends to zero at a poly-
nomial rate when the number of games grows
to infinity (i.e., it is guaranteed to find a dis-
crete perturbation, if it exists).
For our implementation we adopted sims =
1000 and α = 0.5. Tables 8 and 7 give details of
MCTS experiments with single and multiple word
substitutions.
MCTS Word Substitution Strategies We con-
sider two refinements of MCTS: weighting the re-
placement words by importance and filtering to
ensure syntactic/semantic coherence of the input
text. The importance score of a word substitu-
tion is inversely proportional to its distance from
the original word, e.g., pickup(w ← w′) =
1
|U | − 1(
∑
u∈U\{w′} d(w, u)∑
u∈U d(w, u)
), wherew,w′ are re-
spectively the original and perturbed words, d() is
an Lp norm of choice and U a neighbourhood of
w, whose cardinality, which must be greater than
1, is denoted with |U | (as shown in Figure 9). We
can further filter words in the neighborhood such
that only synonyms/antonyms are selected, thus
guaranteeing that a word is replaced by a mean-
ingful substitution; more details are provided in
Section 2.2. While in this work we use a relatively
simple method to find replacements that are syn-
tactically coherent with the input text, more com-
plex methods are available that try also to enforce
semantic consistency (Navigli, 2009; Ling et al.,
2015; Trask et al., 2015), despite this problem is
known to be much harder and we reserve this for
future works.
A.2 Experimental Setup
The network architectures that have been em-
ployed in this work are shown in Figure 10, while
Algorithm 1Monte Carlo Tree Search with UCT heuristic
1: procedure MCTS(text, N, E , sims, α)
2: t← argmaxi∈C Ni(E(text)) ⊲ Store the unperturbed network output, ref. Section2
3: Tree← createTree(text, c, N) ⊲ Create the initial tree
4: root← getRoot(Tree) ⊲ Store the initial vertex
5: P ← [ ] ⊲ List of final perturbations
6: while terminate(Tree) 6= True do ⊲ Loop over the MCTS steps
7: v ←SELECT(Tree, α)
8: C ←EXPAND(v, text)
9: P.insert(SIMULATE(C, text, sims, N, E , t))
10: BACKPROPAGATE(v, root)
11: return P
12: procedure SELECT(Tree, α)
13: L← getLeaves(Tree)
14: return argmaxv∈L
Q(v)
N(v)
+ α
√
2lnN(v′)
N(v)
⊲ UCT best leaf
15: procedure EXPAND(v, text)
16: for i = 0, i < length(text), i++ do
17: v.expand(i) ⊲ Create v’s i-th child
18: return getChildren(v) ⊲ Return the expanded children
19: procedure SIMULATE(C, text, sims, N, E , t)
20: Perturbations← [ ]
21: for c ∈ C do
22: for i = 0, i < sims, i++ do
23: text′ ← samplePerturbation(text, c) ⊲ Ref. Figure 9
24: x← E(text); x′i ← E(text′) ⊲ Embed inputs
25: ifN(x′i) 6= N(x) then ⊲ The output class changes
26: Perturbations.append(text′)
27: Q(c) =maxi∈sims(Nt(x)−Nt(x′i)) ⊲ Update vertex heuristic
28: return Perturbations
29: procedure BACKPROPAGATE(v, root) ⊲ Propagate UCT update
30: while v 6= root do
31: updateUCT (v)
32: v ← getParent(v)
e1
e0
vklmn
odd
strange
top
a better
good
Figure 9: Substitutions are selected either randomly or
according to a score calculated as a function of the dis-
tance from the original word. The sampling region (red
circle) is a finite fraction of the embedding space (blue
circle). Selected candidates can be filtered to enforce
semantic and syntactic constraints. Word the has been
filtered out because it is not grammatically consistent
with the original word strange, while words good,
better and a are filtered out as they lie outside the
neighborhood of the original word.
the embeddings are summarised in Table 4. More
details of both the embeddings and the architec-
tures employed are provided in the main paper,
Section 3.
A.3 Additional Robustness Results
In the remainder of this section we present addi-
tional experimental results of our robustness eval-
uation. More specifically, we show the trends
of upper and lower bounds for different datasets
(Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8); include robustness results
against multiple substitutions; and perform robust-
ness comparison with counter-fitted models (Fig-
ure 11).
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Figure 10: Architecture of CNN and LSTM vanilla models used in this work. (a) Embedding of input words as
vectors of real numbers that are passed as input to a network model that outputs the class to which a text belongs
(shown here with two outputs, e.g., a positive, negative review of a movie). (b) Convolutional network (CNN)
model. (d) LSTM network model. (c) A single LSTM cell in detail.
Embeddings
DIM WORDS DIAMETER DIAMETER (raw)
Keras
5 177175 2.236 1.144
10 88587 3.162 0.957
25 88587 5 0.763
50 88587 7.07 0.664
100 88587 10 0.612
GloVe
50 400003 7.071 10.918
100 400003 10 8.133
GloVeTwitter
25 1193517 5 21.15
50 1193517 7.071 13.947
100 1193517 10 13.058
Table 4: Embeddings used for the experimental evaluation: we report the number of dimensions, the number of
words in each vocabulary and the maximum distance between the two farthest words, namely the diameter (both
after normalization of the input vectors and the raw value, expressed in the L2-norm). After normalization, an
embedding of dimension d will have a diameter equal to
√
d, as a consequence of scaling to 1 the difference
between maximum and minimum values for any dimension of the input.
IMDB
DIMENSION ACCURACY LOWER BOUND
Keras
5 0.789 1.358 ± 0.604
10 0.788 2.134 ± 1.257
25 0.78 1.234 ± 2.062
50 0.78 0.394 ± 0.079
100 0.778 0.31 ± 0.041
GloVe
50 0.758 0.133 ± 0.054
100 0.783 0.127 ± 0.055
GloVeTwitter
25 0.739 0.168 ± 0.093
50 0.752 0.143 ± 0.02
100 0.77 0.177 ± 0.057
Stanford Sentiment Treebank (SST)
DIMENSION ACCURACY LOWER BOUND
Keras
5 0.75 0.623 ± 0.28
10 0.756 0.449 ± 0.283
25 0.757 0.116 ± 0.14
50 0.811 0.029 ± 0.012
100 0.818 0.023 ± 0.006
GloVe
50 0.824 0.053 ± 0.023
100 0.833 0.028 ± 0.015
GloVeTwitter
25 0.763 0.065 ± 0.023
50 0.826 0.059 ± 0.031
100 0.823 0.0± 0.0 (NaN)
NEWS Dataset
DIMENSION ACCURACY LOWER BOUND
GloVe
50 0.625 0.013 ± 0.015
100 0.7 0.018 ± 0.017
GloVeTwitter
50 0.627 0.009 ± 0.006
100 0.716 0.008 ± 0.009
Table 5: Lower bound results for single-word substitutions as found by CNN-Cert and POPQORN, respectively,
on the IMDB, SST and NEWS datasets. Values reported refer to measurements in the L2-norm.
AG News Results: Single Word Substitution
DIAMETER ACCURACY LOWER BOUND
Vanilla Counter-fitted Vanilla Counter-fitted
Keras
5 0.414 0.464 0.072 ± 0.066 0.145 ± 0.147
10 0.491 0.505 0.026 ± 0.025 0.088 ± 0.087
25 0.585 0.597 0.022 ± 0.025 0.032 ± 0.026
50 0.692 0.751 0.015 ± 0.009 0.024 ± 0.015
100 0.779 0.807 0.011 ± 0.007 0.015 ± 0.009
GloVe
50 0.892 0.879 0.04± 0.028 0.043 ± 0.03
100 0.901 0.887 0.027 ± 0.018 0.0± 0.0 (NaN)
GloVeTwitter
25 0.848 0.846 0.033 ± 0.025 0.046 ± 0.036
50 0.877 0.866 0.05± 0.012 0.033 ± 0.018
100 0.833 0.883 0.019 ± 0.012 0.026 ± 0.005
AG News Results: Multiple Words Substitutions
DIAMETER L.B. 2 SUBSTITUTIONS L.B. 3 SUBSTITUTIONS
Vanilla Counter-fitted Vanilla Counter-fitted
Keras
5 0.029 ± 0.024 0.065 ± 0.059 0.025 ± 0.017 0.054 ± 0.044
10 0.013 ± 0.012 0.043 ± 0.042 0.008 ± 0.008 0.028 ± 0.028
25 0.011 ± 0.008 0.015 ± 0.012 0.007 ± 0.006 0.01 ± 0.008
50 0.007 ± 0.004 0.012 ± 0.007 0.005 ± 0.003 0.008 ± 0.005
100 0.006 ± 0.004 0.006 ± 0.004 0.003 ± 0.003 0.003 ± 0.002
GloVe
50 0.02± 0.013 0.02± 0.014 0.013 ± 0.009 0.016 ± 0.01
100 0.015 ± 0.007 0.0± 0.0 (NaN) 0.01 ± 0.006 0.0± 0.0 (NaN)
GloVeTwitter
25 0.014 ± 0.011 0.023 ± 0.017 0.01 ± 0.008 0.0015 ± 0.012
50 0.024 ± 0.005 0.015 ± 0.009 0.016 ± 0.004 0.011 ± 0.007
100 0.009 ± 0.006 0.013 ± 0.002 0.006 ± 0.004 0.008 ± 0.002
DIAMETER L.B. 4 SUBSTITUTIONS L.B. 5 SUBSTITUTIONS
Vanilla Counter-fitted Vanilla Counter-fitted
Keras
5 0.018 ± 0.012 0.035 ± 0.028 0.014 ± 0.009 0.03 ± 0.021
10 0.006 ± 0.005 0.02± 0.019 0.005 ± 0.004 0.016 ± 0.015
25 0.005 ± 0.004 0.007 ± 0.006 0.004 ± 0.003 0.006 ± 0.004
50 0.003 ± 0.002 0.005 ± 0.002 0.003 ± 0.002 0.005 ± 0.003
100 0.003 ± 0.002 0.003 ± 0.002 0.002 ± 0.001 0.002 ± 0.001
GloVe
50 0.009 ± 0.006 0.01± 0.006 0.008 ± 0.005 0.008 ± 0.006
100 0.007 ± 0.004 0.0± 0.0 (NaN) 0.005 ± 0.003 0.0± 0.0 (NaN)
GloVeTwitter
25 0.007 ± 0.005 0.011 ± 0.008 0.006 ± 0.004 0.009 ± 0.006
50 0.008 ± 0.004 0.008 ± 0.006 0.009 ± 0.001 0.006 ± 0.004
100 0.004 ± 0.003 0.006 ± 0.001 0.003 ± 0.002 0.005 ± 0.001
Table 6: Lower bound results for single (top) and multiple word (middle and bottom) substitutions, comparing
vanilla and counter-fitted models. Robustness of counter-fitted models is superior to the vanilla counterpart, except
for high-dimensional embeddings such as GloVe 100d, where it has not been possible to obtain a bound for the
counter-fitted embedding due to computational constraints (nonetheless the counterpart lower bound is close to
zero). Values reported refer to measurements in the L∞-norm.
MCTS Results
EMBEDDING EXEC TIME [s] SUB. (% per-text) SUB. (% per-word) UB
IMDB
Keras50d 29.52 6.0 1.4 0.41± 0.04
GloVe50d 39.61 39.7 5.1 0.39 ± 0.016
GloVeTwitter50d 54.1 47.0 7.7 0.329 ± 0.015
AG NEWS
Keras50d 21.09 50.0 15.6 0.396 ± 0.02
GloVe50d 19.25 22.4 10.8 0.438 ± 0.042
GloVeTwitter50d 17.75 21.4 6.6 0.336 ± 0.019
SST
Keras50d 8.36 52.2 19.9 0.444 ± 0.077
GloVe50d 11.94 81.1 37.4 0.385 ± 0.024
GloVeTwitter50d 11.96 78.1 36.3 0.329 ± 0.024
NEWS
GloVe50d 75.76 96.5 34.0 0.405 ± 0.045
GloVe100d 79.31 89.7 29.1 0.442 ± 0.042
GloVeTwitter50d 77.74 90.9 30.6 0.314 ± 0.033
GloVeTwitter100d 81.29 89.7 27.7 0.417 ± 0.042
Table 7: Upper bound results for single-word substitutions as found by MCTS. We report: the average execution
time for each experiment; the percentage of texts for which we have found at least one successful single-word
substitution (which results in a class change) and the approximate ratio that selecting randomly 1 word from a
text we find a replacement that is successful; the distance to the closest meaningful perturbation to the original
word found, namely an upper bound (differently from Table 3 and for completeness, here values are reported
only considering the values for those words where the perturbations were successful). Values reported refer to
measurements in the L2-norm.
MCTS Multiple Substitutions
EMBEDDING 2 SUBSTITUTIONS 3 SUBSTITUTIONS 4 SUBSTITUTIONS
% per-text % per-word % per-text % per-word % per-text % per-word
IMDB
Keras50d 8.5 5.0 13.4 5.9 18.2 6.6
GloVe50d 43.8 17.7 52.0 21.6 57.5 24.5
GloVeTwitter50d 44.1 18.3 49.3 23.0 57.1 26.4
AG NEWS
Keras50d 68.1 27.5 72.7 38.3 83.3 47.9
GloVe50d 31.4 15.8 33.7 16.8 37.0 19.7
GloVeTwitter50d 23.8 12.5 23.8 15.3 38.0 18.4
SST
Keras50d 64.8 33.0 74.7 40.2 78.0 48.7
GloVe50d 89.4 58.0 96.4 70.8 97.6 76.5
GloVeTwitter50d 88.3 57.8 94.1 69.1 95.3 74.9
NEWS
GloVe50d 98.8 55.4 97.3 62.5 97.3 68.6
GloVe100d 100.0 46.8 95.0 68.0 96.0 65.2
GloVeTwitter50d 94.5 50.5 97.5 63.0 97.5 71.9
GloVeTwitter100d 92.7 49.9 98.1 58.2 98.3 65.3
Table 8: Upper bound results for multiple-word substitutions as found by MCTS. We report the percentage of texts
for which we have found at least a single-word substitution and the approximate ratio that selecting randomly k
words from a text (where k is the number of substitutions allowed) we find a replacement that is successful. We
do not report the average execution times as they are (roughly) the same as in Table 7. Values reported refer to
measurements in the L2-norm. For more than 1 substitution, values reported are an estimate on several random
replacements, as it quickly becomes prohibitive to cover all the possible multiple-word combinations.
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Figure 11: Comparison of robustness of vanilla vs. counter-fitted embeddings for an increasing number of di-
mensions and word substitutions on the AG News dataset. (a) Simple Keras Custom embeddings optimised for
emotional polarity. (b) GloVeTwitter embeddings that encode more complex representations. Counter-fitted em-
beddings exhibit greater robustness on low-dimensional or simple embeddings. A reversed trend is observed on
high-dimensional embeddings or more complex word representations. Values reported refer to measurements in
the L∞-norm.
